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Politics ahead of patients: the battle between medical and chiropractic professional 1 
associations over the inclusion of chiropractic in the American Medicare system 2 
 3 
ABSTRACT 4 
Healthcare professions struggling for legitimacy, recognition, and market share can 5 
become disoriented to their priorities. Healthcare practitioners are expected to put the 6 
interests of patients first. Professional associations represent the interests of their members. 7 
So when a professional association is comprised of healthcare practitioners, its interests may 8 
differ from those of patients, creating a conflict for members. In addition, sometimes 9 
practitioners’ perspectives may be altered by indoctrination to a belief system, or 10 
misinformation, so that a practitioner could be confused as to the reality of patient needs. 11 
Politicians, in attempting to find expedient compromise, can value a “win” in the legislative 12 
arena over the effects of that legislation. These forces all figure into the events that led to the 13 
acceptance of chiropractic into the American Medicare system. Two healthcare systems in a 14 
political fight lost sight of their main purpose: to provide care to patients without doing harm. 15 
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INTRODUCTION 20 
The classical version of the Hippocratic Oath contains a well-known sentiment: “First 21 
do no harm.”1 The oath set forth an idea that has become integral to healthcare professions, 22 
that the interests of patients supersede those of the practitioners. Medical physicians, 23 
chiropractors and others continue to administer a version of it upon graduation.2 Yet, in 24 
struggling for legitimacy, recognition, and market share in a fee-for-service structure, 25 
professions can become disoriented to their priorities. Professional associations, which 26 
represent the interests of their members, who in this case are health practitioners, find that 27 
sometimes those interests conflict with the interests of their members’ patients, or the public 28 
at large. In addition, sometimes practitioners’ perspectives may be altered by indoctrination 29 
to a belief system, or misinformation, so that a practitioner could be confused as to the reality 30 
of patient needs. These forces all figure into the events leading to the acceptance of 31 
chiropractic into the American Medicare system. I believe this paper is the first scholarly 32 
work do explore these events. Themes of professionalization, professional identity, and 33 
legitimacy figure prominently. Chiropractic sought legitimation through wider acceptance by 34 
policymakers and other healthcare providers, and they wanted a share of the aged care 35 
market. Organized medicine sought to protect the public from what they considered a danger 36 
to public health, and they fought to control government reimbursement services. Legislators 37 
acted as they usually do, by weighing public opinion and lobbyist influence, then taking the 38 
expedient action. In the end, chiropractic was accepted into Medicare, but not to the degree 39 
they had hoped. Organized medicine inserted a “poisoned pill” into the legislation at the last 40 
minute, hoping to derail the entire process, but it did not work as anticipated. Legislators 41 
scored a victory, though, by passing a popular bill expanding Medicare with much more than 42 
just the addition of chiropractic. Richard Nixon, who was helped to re-election in 1972 by its 43 
passage, called it “landmark legislation that will end many old inequities and will provide a 44 
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new uniform system of well-earned benefits for older Americans, the blind and the 45 
disabled.”3 All participants in the chiropractic portion of the Medicare expansion process 46 
focused on their own interests rather than those of their patients and some patients were 47 
harmed, physically, mentally, and/or financially.  48 
The [REDACTED] University Human Research Ethics Committee approved this 49 
research (approval number 2012/152). This paper draws on a variety of primary sources of 50 
information, including interviews with several key figures involved in the events described 51 
herein as well as their contemporaneous writings in professional publications, the 52 
Congressional Record, and one audio recording. I also utilized secondary sources like books, 53 
newspapers and journal articles accessed in public and private archives.  54 
The history of health care in the United States of America (USA) involves disparate 55 
forces, including government, insurance companies, pharmaceutical and medical device 56 
manufacturers, doctors’ groups, and professional associations. Emphasis on health promotion 57 
and consumerism have also affected policy decisions. There has been no unified national 58 
policy on healthcare in the USA, but rather many policies on various aspects of healthcare. 59 
This patchwork has resulted in entrepreneurship and research that has offered exceptional 60 
care to some, but not all, and it carries a massive economic cost. Healthcare spending in the 61 
USA is more than twice per capita the amount in the UK, and the overall outcomes are not as 62 
good. All the American government provider systems arose after a private insurance system 63 
was well-established, and were shaped to support that private system, with the fee-for-service 64 
model that was economically advantageous for doctors, hospitals, and medical groups. One 65 
of the most influential organizations in consolidating this structure was the American 66 
Medical Association (AMA) which had successfully opposed all forms of nationalized 67 
healthcare.4 68 
Medical professional associations, including the AMA, have long been influential in 69 
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American healthcare.5 In the mid-19th Century, a wide variety of ‘irregular” health 70 
practitioners competed on a market basis with “regular” or orthodox physicians for patients. 71 
Many medical treatments at this time were either without effect other than placebo; others 72 
were simply dangerous.6 This disorganized environment led a group of physicians to draft a 73 
set of ethical and educational standards for practitioners. The document became the 1847 74 
Code of Medical Ethics of the AMA. It was a public proclamation that formed the basis of 75 
the fiduciary relationship between patients and practitioners. In exchange for the 76 
responsibility of ensuring trust in the uniform standards of skills and behaviour for physicians 77 
as well as acting in the public interest, it claimed autonomy for the profession.7 But 78 
Sociologist Tracey Adams cites the fluidity in the definition of ‘public interest’ and notes 79 
changes in response to public demand over time.  She also acknowledges incomplete 80 
understanding as to the true motivations of professions invoking the concept of public 81 
interest. Whether used in earnest or cynically to gain power and status, the social contract 82 
made the professional association more powerful.8 Physicians were allowed to determine 83 
standards of skills and behaviour that one must demonstrate in order to become and remain a 84 
physician, and even the scope of what is considered medical practice. The 1847 pact formed 85 
the base on which were built the ideas of self-regulation and monopoly power which would 86 
eventually impact all alternative systems, including chiropractic, once it was founded in 87 
1895. Sociologist and authority on professionalism Eliot Freidson noted that exclusivity of 88 
membership and special expertise supported by professional associations helped create public 89 
acceptance of a profession’s self-regulation.9 The social pact could only be subsequently 90 
altered from within the association, and transgressors could be banished and left without its 91 
protections.10  92 
Alternative healthcare systems, which by definition were outside medical associations 93 
like the AMA, were viewed as rivals, marginalized with rhetoric, disparaging labels, and 94 
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later, legal action. Chiropractors were only one group among many, including osteopaths, 95 
homeopaths and Christian Scientists, who were called “quacks” and denigrated in various 96 
publications.11 Beginning in 1870, organized medicine, led by the AMA, began to use its 97 
power in order to suppress these alternative systems. Legislators were lobbied to pass laws 98 
regulating the practice of medicine. Medicine became defined as provision of any type of 99 
healthcare by any type of practitioner. In 1906, the AMA was able to ensure that licensure 100 
was granted only to graduates of schools approved by their Council of Medical Education.12 101 
Thus, alternative practitioners could be prosecuted for practicing medicine without a licence. 102 
This was the beginning of a hegemonic process continued by the AMA for decades.  103 
Professional autonomy is often moderated by government regulation. But calls for 104 
oversight have often come from within a profession. Regulation brings legitimation and 105 
additional enforcement mechanisms for exclusivity of access. That is, the public assumes that 106 
regulated practitioners are competent, and the profession can limit entry to its ranks, which 107 
can help ensure competence of practitioners. It can also decrease competition. This has been 108 
seen frequently with healthcare, where medical professional associations and the state work 109 
together, limiting the ability of alternative practitioners like homeopaths, botanical healers, 110 
apothecaries and others to provide services designated as “medical.”13 111 
A number of other factors also assisted medicine’s rise to dominance. Medical 112 
anthropologist Hans Baer characterizes the hegemony of the AMA as a class issue, involving 113 
a coalition of interests with a common goal: “The emerging alliance around the turn of the 114 
century between the AMA, which consisted primarily of elite practitioners and medical 115 
researchers based in prestigious universities and the industrial capitalist class, ultimately 116 
permitted biomedicine to establish political, economic, and ideological dominance over rival 117 
medical systems.”14  118 
Scientific advancement, such as with inoculations, meant that patients became less 119 
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likely to understand how treatments worked, yet nonetheless were able to benefit from those 120 
treatments. Matthew K. Wynia, long-time Director of the AMA Institute for Ethics and 121 
Center for Patient Safety, posits that over time this led to pride, paternalism, loss of empathy 122 
and reduced standards of customer service in the medical profession. The growth of scientific 123 
medicine also achieved so many successes in cures and treatments that arguments against 124 
medical control of healthcare seemed almost ridiculous.15 Hubris and power combined to lead 125 
to a sense of entitlement. The AMA began to believe its judgment was infallible, and that the 126 
state was its enforcement arm.  127 
The hegemonic process helped lead to the disappearance of some alternative 128 
therapies, but many still exist. Of all the complementary and alternative (CAM) health 129 
professions, only American osteopathy took the route of eliminating its alternative practices 130 
and beliefs. This resulted in the AMA removing its cultism label from osteopathy in 1961. 131 
The AMA even extended membership to osteopaths and allopathic residency programmes 132 
accepted osteopathic graduates. But the tradeoff for osteopathy was that by the 1970s it had 133 
lost its unique identity in America and was virtually indistinguishable from medicine.16 134 
Several authors have touched on the chiropractic episode, but little historical analysis 135 
has been undertaken. Two contemporaneous authors and chiropractic supporters, AMA 136 
whistleblower William Trever and chiropractor Chester Wilk, adopted a position of outrage 137 
at the tactics of the medical opposition to chiropractic, and both related much first-hand 138 
information in their books. Wilk later became the main plaintiff in a successful anti-trust 139 
lawsuit against the AMA.17 Trever included reproductions of internal AMA and state-based 140 
medical group memos as well as correspondence with legislators. Some of these documents 141 
were also used as exhibits in Wilk’s suit. But neither author related the specific details of the 142 
Medicare episode.18 Peterson and Wiese in Chiropractic: An Illustrated History, sociologists 143 
Holly Folk, Susan Smith-Cunnien and Walter Wardwell, and historian J. Stuart Moore only 144 
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briefly mention Medicare in their histories.19  145 
None of the above sources explain the legislative manoeuvring that resulted in the 146 
outcome. None provide the details of how the traditional use of radiography in chiropractic 147 
enabled the AMA to develop the x-ray clause for the legislation, the mechanism by which the 148 
scope of practice was limited. A brief background on the traditional chiropractic healthcare 149 
paradigm is necessary for context. 150 
THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF CHIROPRACTIC 151 
Although manual manipulation of bones and joints as a healing art has existed for 152 
centuries, the particular method that came to be called chiropractic originated in the USA in 153 
1895. For the first few decades of the its existence, chiropractic considered itself alternative 154 
rather than complementary to medicine, and some in the profession still do. The traditional 155 
chiropractic ideology or practice paradigm was a form of vitalism. Daniel David Palmer, 156 
known as D.D., was a Canadian-born merchant and self-styled “magnetic” healer living in 157 
Davenport, Iowa at that time. Palmer credited a mysterious force that he called Universal 158 
Intelligence, essentially a form of god, as responsible for life and health. This force 159 
manifested in humans as “Innate Intelligence” in the brain, and was transmitted as “nerve 160 
impulses” down the spinal column through nerves to all the organs and body parts. Therefore, 161 
if a vertebra was slightly out of place, a state he called “subluxation”, it could impinge 162 
nerves, alter the flow of the impulses, and create ill health. D.D. held the opinion that 95% of 163 
disease was caused by subluxated vertebrae and the remaining 5% by subluxated peripheral 164 
joints, such as the elbow or ankle.20 Palmer began teaching his new theory to others almost 165 
immediately, including to his son Bartlett Joshua Palmer, known as B.J. After D.D. suddenly 166 
departed Iowa for the west coast in 1902, B.J. assumed responsibility for the school his father 167 
had started, asserting himself as leader of the budding profession. In 1910 he made a decision 168 
that would have repercussions more than half a century later by incorporating x-ray into 169 
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chiropractic as a way to prove subluxations.21  170 
Through the mid-20th century, chiropractic took steps toward professionalization. 171 
Kansas and North Dakota were the first states to license chiropractors and by 1963 all but 172 
two states had chiropractic legislation, although scopes of practice varied.22 The National 173 
Board of Chiropractic Examiners was established in 1961, and the Federation of Chiropractic 174 
Licensing Boards in 1968.23 The Council on Chiropractic Education, formed in 1935 by the 175 
National Chiropractic Association (forerunner to the ACA) in an effort to standardize 176 
chiropractic education, was accredited by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare 177 
in August 1972.24 Reforms led to the decline in numbers of teaching institutions from 42 in 178 
1930, most with 18-month courses, to 15 in 1963, all with 4-year courses. These efforts seem 179 
to have been taken in a sincere effort to gain legitimacy. Donning the mantle of orthodoxy in 180 
organizational structures must also have made chiropractic more palatable by a wider swath 181 
of legislators. 182 
Like other CAM professions, chiropractic has a schism that it has not yet reconciled.25 183 
The two main groups of chiropractors have often been referred to as “straights” and “mixers.” 184 
This division reflected an emphasis on treatments employed. Straights used manual 185 
manipulation or “adjusting” of the spine for all ailments. Mixers “adjusted” as well, but also 186 
used heat, cold, ultraviolet, massage techniques, and other ancillary measures not including 187 
drugs and surgery. In this paper, I change the focus of the division from treatment methods to 188 
aetiology of disease. Broadly, some within the profession hold to the traditional idea that 189 
subluxations are the predominant influence on health, and often radiography is considered the 190 
primary tool for detecting this “lesion.”26 This group will be referred to as traditional or 191 
vitalistic chiropractors. The other group will be referred to as biomedically-oriented 192 
chiropractors. Generally, they believe in germ theory, the utility of vaccinations, judicious 193 
use of diagnostic imaging, and other mainstream healthcare tenets. They focus on manual 194 
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therapy for biomechanical conditions, view themselves as complementary rather than 195 
alternative, and seek integration with overarching health systems. In my opinion, it is more 196 
important to understand the paradigm a healthcare practitioner applies to health and disease 197 
than to focus on treatment methods. The overall paradigm is more revealing of a 198 
practitioner’s comprehension of diagnosis, science, and evidence, and therefore gives greater 199 
insight into the differences in the chiropractic factions. 200 
These groups do not neatly divide into the two main professional associations in the 201 
USA, the American Chiropractic Association (ACA) and International Chiropractors 202 
Association (ICA). There is overlap of health paradigm in both membership populations, 203 
although the ICA tends to have more traditionalists in its leadership and constituents, and the 204 
ACA more biomedicals. In the 1960s, the ACA had about twice as many members as the 205 
ICA. There were also “independents” who belonged to neither group, and in this group the 206 
paradigm varied as well. For purposes of this paper, the predominant paradigm of each 207 
association will be used in the understanding that uniformity of opinion did not exist, but 208 
tendencies did. 209 
THE AMA’S EFFORTS TO CONTAIN AND ELIMINATE CHIROPRACTIC 210 
By the 1960s, most alternative health systems in the USA had either disappeared, like 211 
Thompsonians and naprapaths, had been marginalised into insignificance like Christian 212 
Scientists and naturopaths, or been incorporated into medicine like osteopaths. Chiropractors, 213 
however, retained their independence, and had gained a small but consistent part of the 214 
healthcare market. About 10% of Americans and Canadians have used their services.27 215 
Chiropractic became a particular target of the AMA. The AMA’s methods were many and 216 
varied. They printed and distributed thousands of anti-chiropractic brochures to schools, 217 
colleges, medical practices and organizations. They sent fake prospective student applications 218 
to chiropractic colleges in order to expose weaknesses in the education system. They wrote 219 
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letters to professional journals and popular magazines, lobbied legislators at the local, state, 220 
and federal levels to try to exclude chiropractic, and they pressured members of influential 221 
committees.28  222 
 In 1963, the AMA formed a Committee on Quackery to “[determine] the true nature 223 
of chiropractic and its practitioners, and to inform the medical profession and the public of its 224 
findings.”29 The product of this investigation was a pamphlet, entitled Chiropractic: The 225 
Unscientific Cult. In setting the tone for the Committee, the AMA House of Delegates issued 226 
the following statement: “Either the theories and practices of scientific medicine are right and 227 
those of the cultists are wrong, or the theories and practices of the cultists are right and those 228 
of scientific medicine are wrong.”30 In 1967, H. Doyl Taylor, secretary of the Committee on 229 
Quackery and a leading figure in AMA efforts on chiropractic, spoke at a “quackery 230 
workshop” held at Ball State University in Indiana, framing the discussion with this 231 
statement: “As you know, [chiropractic] is a cult, about as far removed from scientific 232 
medicine, the diagnosis and treatment of human illness as it is possible to get.”31 The 233 
ridiculing nature of these words de-legitimised chiropractors in the structure of the argument. 234 
It portrayed the AMA as representing the norm and chiropractic as deviant. Sociologists 235 
Yvonne Villanueva-Russell and Susan Smith-Cunnien asserted that by defining chiropractic 236 
as “deviant” and using derogatory terms like “unscientific cult,” the AMA could frame itself 237 
as mainstream, reasonable, and scientific, for its own social and political benefit.32  238 
Despite acknowledging that a variety of practice paradigms existed within 239 
chiropractic, the AMA’s focus remained on the vitalistic chiropractors.33 Some of the 240 
statements by the Committee on Quackery seem political or adversarial, rather than clinically 241 
detached: “With the establishment of the Committee on Quackery, in 1964, extensive study 242 
was made to determine exactly what chiropractic is and where it is most vulnerable to public 243 
exposure.”34 Trever expresses it this way: “the Committee lacked sufficient ‘scientific proof’ 244 
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to back their slanderous campaign.”35 Because of the extreme measures to ensure secrecy at 245 
the AMA, the totality of the information that the Committee obtained on chiropractic 246 
practices is not known.36 However, the examples they cited were damning for chiropractic. 247 
The pamphlet included reproductions of advertisements claiming cures for various diseases 248 
including cancer and mental illness. Chiropractors were quoted making statements against the 249 
utility of vaccinations. Repeatedly noted was an epistemology invoking appeal to authority; 250 
the “authority” was usually either D.D. or B.J. Palmer. The Unit Plan also denigrated 251 
chiropractic educational standards, which were, in fact, inferior to those of medicine.37 It 252 
further stated: “The prime mission of the Committee on Quackery at its founding was to be, 253 
first, the containment of chiropractic, and, ultimately, the elimination of chiropractic as a 254 
health hazard.”38 Part of the plan was to influence legislative bodies.39 It stated that “the 255 
Medicare-Medicaid rules on chiropractic [must be] drawn as tightly as possible.”40 The Unit 256 
Plan described ghost-writing policy statements and distributing publications on behalf of 257 
various “independent” bodies such as the American Federation of Labor-Congress of 258 
Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) and the Consumer Federation of America in order to 259 
lend the weight of ostensible support from respected organizations to their message.41 The 260 
AMA sponsored multiple regional conferences called “Health Quackery – Chiropractic” over 261 
a period of five years. They attempted to derail accreditation of chiropractic schools. Doctors 262 
and hospitals were forbidden from granting chiropractors any privileges including receiving 263 
referrals of patients for x-rays or blood tests. The Unit Plan did concede that after 264 
chiropractic ceased to exist, chiropractors, with their manual skills, might be able to be 265 
retrained “to serve as another extension of the physician’s hands.”42  266 
At this point it could be argued that the AMA and other medical associations 267 
genuinely believed that they were acting in the public interest, fulfilling their fiduciary duty 268 
as they saw it, by attempting to limit public access to chiropractors, whom they viewed as 269 
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dangerous. Their later actions became more ethically questionable.  270 
THE INCLUSION OF CHIROPRACTIC IN MEDICARE 271 
In 1964, Lyndon Johnson won the presidency; his agenda included improving 272 
healthcare.43 However, concessions had to be made to medical special interest groups, 273 
including coverage for physician outpatient services as well as hospital visits for both general 274 
and specialty practitioners. Physicians were given total freedom in diagnosis, treatment and 275 
prescription of medications. The fee-for-service model was retained, and people were able to 276 
see whichever doctor they wanted.44 The bill with these provisions became the first iteration 277 
of Medicare, and it passed with AMA approval in 1965,45 resulting in improved health and 278 
well-being for many people across the country.46 Medicare quickly became popular, and 279 
other health professions, including chiropractic, optometry, social work, and eight others 280 
requested inclusion. Congress opened an investigation into the possibility of expanding 281 
Medicare.47 In 1967, Wilbur Cohen, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), 282 
was tasked with undertaking the study.  283 
The government required the health professions to provide evidence of legitimacy. 284 
The Federation of Chiropractic Licensing Boards (FCLB) oversaw chiropractic licensing. 285 
Chiropractor Richard E. Vincent represented the FCLB in testimony to the House Ways and 286 
Means Committee, assuring Congress that there were professional standards as well as a 287 
mechanism for upholding them.48 However, the assessment process turned out to be neither 288 
straightforward nor transparent. According to sociologist and HEW committee member 289 
Walter Wardwell, the report essentially had been written before the committee even met.49 290 
He also related that pressure was applied to members of the committee to adopt the AMA 291 
position. Wardwell later revealed all the anti-chiropractic documents and verbal 292 
recommendations from AMA members that he had received as a member of the committee.50  293 
Sociologist Catherine Biggs has indicated that in Canada, the government responded 294 
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to the tension between the popularity of chiropractic services and the opposition of the 295 
powerful medical lobby by calling for a Royal Commission or equivalent to study the matter. 296 
In Canada’s case, the government reports provided rationales for including chiropractic in 297 
state-funded healthcare.51 Not so in the USA. The final HEW report issued 28 December 298 
1968 recommended that chiropractic not be included in Medicare, concluding:  299 
Chiropractic theory and practice are not based upon the body of basic 300 
knowledge related to health, disease, and health care that has been widely 301 
accepted by the scientific community. Moreover, irrespective of its theory, 302 
the scope and quality of chiropractic education do not prepare the 303 
practitioner to make an adequate diagnosis and provide appropriate 304 
treatment.52  305 
Upon receiving news of the report, the chiropractic professional associations 306 
responded with a White Paper, accusing Congress of a biased process and attempting to 307 
clarify what they perceived as mischaracterizations of the profession. Congress dismissed it 308 
as invalid.53 The two main chiropractic associations, the ACA and ICA, embarked on a 309 
political pressure campaign. It was comprised of three elements: working to amalgamate the 310 
two associations, letter writing to Congress, and lobbying through personal connections. 311 
Being faced with a larger, better funded, and more politically connected lobbying 312 
organization in the AMA, it was of paramount importance for chiropractic to present a 313 
unified front to the world. In addition, experience had taught chiropractors that state and 314 
federal panels insisted on a single body of representation. ACA member James Cox 315 
remembers: “I’ve testified in my state of Indiana before House and Senate committees. If you 316 
go in there split, you know what they say: ‘You get it together and then you come back.’”54 317 
This created the impetus to join the two chiropractic professional associations. The ICA had 318 
about 4000 members.55 They were overt in their advocacy of a traditional, vitalistic view of 319 
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chiropractic and wanted the legislation to consider only the treatment of vertebral 320 
subluxation.56 The ACA had about 7500 members, and tended to be more biomedically-321 
oriented. The ACA’s position was that chiropractors should be reimbursed for all the services 322 
that they provided, not just for attending to vertebral subluxations. These services varied state 323 
to state, depending on the licensure regulations, but included therapeutic ultrasound, 324 
electrotherapy, massage techniques, and rehabilitation protocols.57 325 
The ICA insisted that the ACA agree to a definition of chiropractic known as the 326 
“Chicago scope of practice.”58 It focused on spinal subluxations as the cause of all disease, 327 
with radiography for subluxation detection. Contemporaneous articles in chiropractic 328 
magazines included promotion of x-ray imaging for subluxation analysis by ICA 329 
chiropractors. For example: “It enables him to see inside and through the living body, 330 
pinpointing with accuracy, the health problem areas… This aid is necessary in visualising the 331 
misalignments of the spinal column…”59 The strength of this belief can be seen in its 332 
longevity and the language used by some of its proponents. In 1977, Leon R Coelho, chair of 333 
the ICA Radiation Control Committee and director of the Roentgenology Department of the 334 
Palmer College of Chiropractic wrote an article entitled “If spinography is dead, so is 335 
chiropractic” in an ICA publication and included the following:  336 
Spinography is an imperfect system. Chiropractic is an imperfect 337 
system, yet growing and surviving in an imperfect world. But do you know 338 
something? IT IS THE BEST OF ALL SYSTEMS OF WHICH WE ARE 339 
CONSCIOUS. HAVE FAITH IN IT, NOURISH IT, LOVE IT, because it 340 
is all part of something much greater than us, and that something, within 341 
itself, is perfection. [All emphasis original.]60 342 
In contrast, ACA members published articles on the mainstream use of the x-ray for 343 
pathological diagnosis and railed against the idea of using ionising radiation as a screening 344 
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tool for all patients.61 The ICA model for the radiographic visualization of subluxations was 345 
denigrated by ACA chiropractors including Joseph Howe, who noted that normal anatomical 346 
asymmetry, minor variations in osseous architecture, slight changes in patient position during 347 
radiography, and the physics of the x-ray beam all invalidated the idea that “subluxations” 348 
could be identified and quantified on radiographs. The tiny misalignments claimed by some 349 
chiropractors to be lesions causing disease were due either to illusion or imagination.62 The 350 
schism in chiropractic was particularly stark on the use of the x-ray. The potential merger of 351 
the two chiropractic associations failed again.63  352 
The ICA and ACA submitted separate statements to the government. The ICA 353 
requested reimbursement for spinal x-rays and spinal adjustments only. The ACA statement 354 
acknowledged the usefulness of standard physical examination and diagnostic tests and also 355 
discussed “subluxation,” but as a biomechanical dysfunction, rather than a vitalistic entity, 356 
and without the necessity of radiography to identify.64 The ACA statement also invoked the 357 
idea of freedom of choice in health care and requested recognition of states’ rights in regard 358 
to scope of practice. That is, the ACA argued that Medicare legislation should reimburse for 359 
whatever services chiropractors were licensed to provide in each state, rather than be limited 360 
to adjusting spinal subluxations as the ICA advocated. This limit was viewed as overriding a 361 
state’s right to determine the scope of practice for chiropractors.65 HEW denied this argument 362 
in 1969, citing lack of evidence for the effectiveness of chiropractic treatment and asserting 363 
that their responsibility for the “safety and welfare of beneficiaries” allowed HEW to 364 
determine the services to be reimbursed.66 365 
Because the two chiropractic associations portrayed chiropractic differently, the AMA 366 
was able to choose a portrayal of chiropractic that could serve to bolster its position opposing 367 
Medicare coverage for chiropractors. Hoyt B. Duke of the ACA recognised this, writing that 368 
the rigidity of the ICA’s position and the infighting that it caused were making chiropractic 369 
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vulnerable to attack by the AMA.67 There is no indication that either the ICA or ACA were 370 
acting cynically or simply playing for power; they both sincerely believed that their position 371 
was the correct one. The ICA believed that they were preserving chiropractic more truly to 372 
the founder’s ideals. The ACA was less concerned with tradition and was trying to move 373 
chiropractic into a new phase of existence, embracing a more scientific approach to 374 
healthcare. 375 
The two chiropractic professional associations did cooperate on other lobbying 376 
efforts. David D. (Dave) Palmer, grandson of founder D.D. Palmer, was the president of the 377 
Palmer College of Chiropractic in the late 1960s and early 1970s. As such, his assent was 378 
considered necessary for consensus on any strategic chiropractic-wide project. Palmer met 379 
with ICA President William Day, ACA President Gerald Brassard, and other influential 380 
chiropractors in 1970 to discuss the “intensified Medicare-inclusion plan.”68 It included an 381 
organized letter writing operation to encourage Congressional Representatives and Senators 382 
to support including chiropractic in the Medicare expansion bill. The sample letters 383 
distributed by the chiropractic associations highlighted the benefits of chiropractic and also 384 
appealed to sensitive areas in American politics: market freedom and American 385 
Exceptionalism.69 American Exceptionalism was expressed by sociologist and political 386 
theorist Seymour Lipset as: liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism, and laissez-faire. 387 
Lipset noted that even before the rise of the neoconservatives, which started with President 388 
Ronald Reagan, the USA had lower rates of taxation, a less developed welfare state, and 389 
fewer government-owned industries than other industrialised nations.70 The idea of freedom 390 
in the healthcare marketplace attained similar enshrinement and this was also present in the 391 
chiropractic community.71 Chiropractors argued that the AMA and government policies were 392 
restricting peoples’ freedom to choose the health care provider that they desired. William 393 
Day wrote, “It is the birth-right of every American citizen to have the right to choose his own 394 
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particular type of health care, and it is our duty to make it possible for them to have the 395 
opportunity to choose chiropractic!”72 The goal was to have 10,000 letters sent from 396 
chiropractors and patients. Ultimately, at least a million letters went out.73 Because of this 397 
popular support, many House Members introduced bills on the subject. Congressman Wilbur 398 
Mills, who had been instrumental to the passage of Medicaid legislation, noted that this had 399 
influenced the decision to include chiropractic.74 400 
William Scott (Bill) Day was a particularly influential figure in the lobbying effort. 401 
Day had been a Washington State Representative from 1959-1969 before being elected to the 402 
State Senate from 1969-1980.75 He was a graduate of the Palmer School (1947), and the son 403 
of two Palmer graduates. He took over the clinic in Spokane, Washington that his parents 404 
started, and his son Tim, also a Palmer graduate, has operated it since Day’s death in 1984. 405 
Day helped ensure that traditional chiropractic was legislated as the scope of practice in 406 
Washington.76 He also supported the traditional paradigm for chiropractic in Medicare, 407 
testifying to that effect as Legislative Chairman of the ICA in front of the Senate Finance 408 
Committee on September 16, 1970, along with other representatives of the ICA and ACA.77  409 
Steve Renner also attended the Palmer school, and was employed in Day’s clinic from 410 
1976 - 1982. He recalled discussing the matter with Day: “[Bill] became friends with 411 
Washington State's two U.S. Senators, Henry Jackson and Warren Magnuson. These two 412 
were high-ranking Democrats in Congress. So because Bill was subluxation-based and his 413 
connections with Jackson and Magnuson is how chiropractic became included in Medicare 414 
[sic].”78 Richard Vincent, an ACA chiropractor and president of the FCLB at the time, recalls 415 
the situation similarly: “Bill Day was President of the [Washington] State Senate. Magnuson 416 
was the Senator from Washington to Federal Government, and he was chair of the 417 
Appropriations Committee, powerful. He was a driving force on healthcare. Now this is my 418 
personal opinion: the influence that Bill Day had on Senator Magnuson was what drove the 419 
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subluxation [focus of the legislation].”79 Day’s perspective, as president of the ICA, was 420 
transmitted to the federal legislature through Senators Jackson and Magnuson. It limited 421 
chiropractic to the Chicago definition, that is, spinal subluxation relief requiring routine 422 
radiography to detect subluxations. Later, in December 1972, Palmer issued a statement 423 
disavowing the indiscriminate or routine use of x-rays, but affirming the remainder of the 424 
“Chicago definition” of chiropractic.80 425 
The Congressional debate on chiropractic was robust. Influential Senator Ted 426 
Kennedy opposed including chiropractic in Medicare. He cited cases of chiropractors 427 
overstating their abilities to cure serious disease, like cancer, causing patients to avoid seeing 428 
medical doctors, with tragic results. But other Senators countered that all health care 429 
professions had a small percentage of incompetent or fraudulent practitioners. State 430 
regulation, under which licensing/registration boards were established and maintained, was 431 
considered adequate to protect the public in those professions and so it should be for 432 
chiropractic as well.81 A few legislators related positive personal experience with a 433 
chiropractor, but freedom of choice proved to be a particularly powerful argument regarding 434 
healthcare in Congress. Most legislators agreed that the government should not tell citizens 435 
that they could not go to a chiropractor instead of a medical doctor if that was their choice. 82 436 
As sociologist Paul Starr noted, Americans were not willing to submit to the 437 
judgement of experts, even in the realm of healthcare.83 In fact, there was little evidence of 438 
clinical effectiveness on which legislators could base a judgement. There were case anecdotes 439 
from the publications of the professional associations and patient testimonials in pamphlets, 440 
advertisements, and the letters to Congress. These “success stories” did not contain the level 441 
of clinical detail to be publishable in peer-reviewed journals. The first randomized controlled 442 
trial of chiropractic was not published until 1990.84 The AMA gleaned evidence against 443 
chiropractic similarly, from advertisements, anecdotes of patients harmed by chiropractors, 444 
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and by the investigation the AMA did into chiropractic education.85   445 
The bill expanding Medicare was debated in the U.S. Congress for two years, passing 446 
in 1972, and it included chiropractic.86 It contained 144 changes in welfare and health 447 
benefits, and was estimated to cost $5 billion. Its effects were vast, including coverage for 448 
chronic renal disease, disabled people under 65, a Chiropractic was a very small part.87 449 
According to the New York Times (NYT), the House members of the conference committee 450 
wanted to delay inclusion of chiropractic in favour of another study of it, but Senate members 451 
wanted inclusion. Political “horse trading” ensued and the House yielded to the Senate in 452 
exchange for unknown concessions on other matters. In addition, the NYT reported that some 453 
sources said Wilbur Mills was annoyed at the AMA, and others indicated he “was tired of 454 
standing up almost alone to the pressure of the chiropractors.”88 The AMA took action to try 455 
to neutralize chiropractic’s inclusion just before final passage of the bill in Congress by 456 
leveraging the idea that “subluxations” were the cause of disease. Medical doctor Stephen 457 
Barrett, a leading figure in the fight against chiropractic for decades, wrote to the AMA and 458 
suggested that they bring a lawsuit, to “present to the court the impossibility of writing 459 
regulations to pay for something that did not exist.” But he recalled receiving no response.89 460 
Instead, the AMA decided to try to amend the legislation just before passage. 461 
AMA EFFORTS TO LIMIT THE UTILITY OF MEDICARE FOR 462 
CHIROPRACTORS 463 
After the House and Senate each pass their versions of a bill, any differences between 464 
the two are reconciled in a conference committee. This committee is usually composed of 465 
senior members of the House and Senate committees that originally considered the bill. 466 
Amendments may be introduced during the conference committee, and after consensus is 467 
achieved, the final version of the bill is produced for a vote in both the House and Senate. 468 
This is a straight yea or nay vote; no further amendments are allowed on any bill that has 469 
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been through conference committee. If passed, it is sent to the President to sign into law or to 470 
veto.  471 
According to Stephen Barrett, wording from the AMA was inserted during the 472 
conference committee.90 The specific clause allowed reimbursement to chiropractors only for 473 
manual manipulation of spinal subluxations that had been documented by x-ray. No other 474 
services were covered, nor was the cost of taking and interpreting the radiographs 475 
themselves. Thirty years after the Medicare legislation passed, Barrett recalled the episode:  476 
A few weeks after the law was passed, Doyl Taylor, head of the AMA 477 
Department of Investigation told me that when chiropractic inclusion 478 
appeared inevitable, the “subluxation” language was inserted with the hope 479 
of preventing chiropractors from actually being paid. The idea's originator 480 
thought that because chiropractic's traditional (metaphysical) 481 
“subluxations” were visible only to chiropractors, this provision would 482 
sabotage their coverage.91 483 
The NYT reported on this amendment made during conference committee, but gives 484 
no attribution to any person(s) for the change.92 The amendment effectively nullified the 485 
practical utility of reimbursement for chiropractic services, and may have been another factor 486 
that allowed the House to accede to the inclusion of chiropractic in Medicare. At this point in 487 
the Medicare expansion process, any legislator objecting to one element in this massive and 488 
popular bill would have had to vote against the entire bill, a politically unwise move. The 489 
final bill, including the amendment to chiropractic, passed in both Houses. On 30 October, 490 
just a few days before the presidential election of 1972, President Richard M. Nixon signed it 491 
into law.  492 
The regulations in the bill had been narrowly formulated so that chiropractors were 493 
considered “physicians” for the purpose of radiographically diagnosing and manually treating 494 
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a “subluxation” but not in any wider definition. Specifically, they were not “physicians” 495 
under U.S.C. 1395x (s)(3), the part of the law that provided reimbursement for taking x-rays. 496 
Reimbursement was also not given for physical exam or other diagnostic procedures.93 497 
Medicare reimbursed radiographs if a medical doctor ordered them, but the AMA forbade 498 
medical doctors and hospitals at the time from accepting referrals from chiropractors.94 499 
Chiropractors were licensed in all fifty states to take radiographs. But if they performed their 500 
own radiography, chiropractors would either have to absorb the cost themselves or ask 501 
patients to pay for them. Therefore this legislation caused potential financial harm to patients. 502 
Members of the ICA greeted the news of inclusion in Medicare with short-lived 503 
jubilation until they realized they would not be reimbursed for the mandated radiography.95 504 
But within the ACA, it caused an immediate division of opinion. Some members thought 505 
Medicare should be abandoned, rather than submitting to the codification in law of such a 506 
narrow scope of practice. Joseph Howe was an outspoken ACA member involved with the 507 
internal politics of the situation. He assessed the legislative outcome as deleterious and 508 
expressed his opinion to the leadership: “I said throw it back. Please don’t tie us in to that 509 
idea of subluxation being the only thing we do. But they didn’t [throw it back]. I think, 510 
personally, it’s my opinion that Medicare has been a detriment to the profession from the 511 
beginning.”96 However, the new law brought prestige, legitimation, and gave access to a new 512 
cohort of patients, even if chiropractors received inadequate reimbursement for those in that 513 
cohort. Ultimately, the ACA leadership decided to accept it, hoping that it might be 514 
broadened in the future.97 James Winterstein, long-time president of National College of 515 
Chiropractic, and an ACA member at the time, acknowledges the dilemma: “I was supportive 516 
of inclusion of chiropractic medicine in the Medicare program, but not in the way it was 517 
statutorily developed [limiting the scope of practice to spinal subluxation relief and requiring 518 
x-rays]. That view was shared by most so called “mixers” of the time. We all thought, 519 
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however that this was the beginning that that as a profession we would be able to change the 520 
language to provide a far better functioning statute for the profession and our profession.”98 521 
THE CHIROPRACTIC SOLUTION TO MEDICARE REQUIREMENTS 522 
Chiropractors had many different definitions of vertebral subluxation, mostly tiny 523 
changes in position, not acknowledged as real by the medical community and unable to be 524 
reliably identified on radiographs by different chiropractors.99 The ACA called for a meeting 525 
to standardize the definition of radiographically demonstrable subluxations. The meeting took 526 
place in Texas in November 1972 and became referred to as the Houston Conference. Within 527 
the ACA there existed a group of chiropractors with a special interest in diagnostic imaging. 528 
They undertook additional training as well as written and oral certification exams in order to 529 
achieve the Diplomate of the American Chiropractic Board of Radiology (DACBR). These 530 
“chiropractic radiologists” were called upon at the Houston Conference.100 531 
The radiographic demonstration of subluxation was imaginary to at least some 532 
involved in the Houston Conference. There were deep misgiving and arguments on the 533 
subject. Many of the participants considered the “subluxation” to be a functional lesion of 534 
joint motion, rather than a displacement. For these chiropractors, there were no vitalistic 535 
implications of “the cause of all disease”, but rather “subluxation” was a biomechanical 536 
dysfunction amenable to a variety of manual methods, of which chiropractic adjustments 537 
were only one.101  538 
 The new Medicare requirement ran counter to safety guidelines on the use of x-rays in 539 
requiring all patients to be radiographed. Joseph Howe wrote: “To demand that there be 540 
radiological evidence of vertebral subluxation in order to justify chiropractic treatment is 541 
irresponsible.  It is totally contradictory to proper radiological health procedure which 542 
demands a clinical reason for any application of ionizing radiation to a human being.”102 The 543 
x-ray requirement even seemed nonsensical to some legislators. Senator Mike Gravel 544 
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recognized that the AMA had put in place a requirement that ran counter to best medical 545 
practice. He wrote that the law “imposes an improper interference with the work and 546 
judgment of the Chiropractor. It does not guarantee the health and well-being of the patient; 547 
in fact, it may endanger it.”103 The idea that there was no safe dose of ionizing radiation, 548 
called the linear, no-threshold (LNT) model, had been introduced to the world by Herman 549 
Muller at his Nobel Prize acceptance speech in 1946.104 Although there have been challenges 550 
to this model, 105 and it has never been fully accepted in the chiropractic community,106 it 551 
became the dominant model in the ensuing decades. By 1956 the National Academy of 552 
Sciences (USA) had adopted it. Then, within a few years this paradigm “had transformed 553 
governmental regulatory agencies in many countries, including recommendations of the 554 
UN.”107 The National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) issued 555 
radiation protection standards in 1954, which were revised in 1957 and 1958.108 The 1958 556 
edition introduced the risk/benefit calculation to the application of ionizing radiation, which 557 
later evolved into the ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) principle.109 Despite 558 
this, formal training in radiation safety was spotty in medicine.110 However, by the time of 559 
the Medicare expansion in 1972 the potential hazards of x-rays, even at low, diagnostic 560 
doses, had been well-publicized, and should have been known to chiropractors, physicians, 561 
and legislators involved in the issue. There is evidence that this in fact was known in the 562 
medical community; a letter from the Lehigh Valley Committee Against Health Fraud, a 563 
group of health professionals including Stephen Barrett, to the United States Senate Finance 564 
Committee stated that they considered chiropractic x-rays to be “window dressing” and “a 565 
radiation hazard.”111 This statement acknowledges both the understanding of the potential 566 
danger of low levels of ionizing radiation, as well as the fact that x-rays should not be used in 567 
the absence of clinical justification. In light of the comments above, key figures in both the 568 
medical and chiropractic communities did understand the safety issue and spoke out about it. 569 
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It therefore seems more likely that the issue was ignored rather than unknown. 570 
Despite concerns, the attendees at Houston Conference decided to comply with the 571 
ACA leadership and tried to find a way to make the new legislation workable. Chiropractor 572 
and DACBR James Cox recalled: “While I felt apprehension about taking the program [the 573 
limited scope of practice as defined in Medicare] as it was... the consensus out of my 574 
profession and out of the ACA was that it was the proper step to take, so I supported that, 575 
because that’s what my profession wanted to do.”112 The DACBR solution was to use  576 
various medically recognized vertebral displacements and postural changes like 577 
spondylolisthesis and scoliosis, calling them “subluxation” purely to meet the Medicare 578 
requirement of radiographically documenting a positional change in one or more vertebrae in 579 
order to justify reimbursement for treatment.113 James Winterstein remembered: “ACA 580 
developed a “Medicare Manual” [the Basic Chiropractic Procedural Manual] and Joe Howe 581 
and I wrote the section on radiography mostly at the kitchen table at my home office in West 582 
Chicago, Illinois. In the manual we defined “subluxation” and showed examples and drew 583 
radiographs from my practice as evidence for the various types of subluxation.”114 Joseph 584 
Howe added: “We came up with seventeen classifications, which was just foolishness, 585 
frankly.”115 These were political, not clinical definitions of subluxation. The DACBRs and 586 
likely the ACA leadership knew that their “subluxations” were not the ultimate cause of 587 
disease. Irradiating patients in order to document these subluxations ran counter to the 588 
individual risk/benefit appraisal that should have been performed on each patient when 589 
considering the use of x-rays. But, chiropractors were then able to document their “lesion” as 590 
required by the law. The ACA published the “subluxations” in the Manual as well as in other 591 
media.116 They also paid for several members to travel around the country giving 592 
presentations disseminating the system.117 Some ACA members like Joseph Howe were 593 
uncomfortable with the situation, but participated nonetheless: “Jim Winterstein and I 594 
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developed slides of all those things. We made it up in a carousel [for slide presentation] and 595 
we set out, a group of us, to teach that across the world. Something I have regretted ever 596 
since.”118 Chiropractors had found a way to make the legislation workable, although they 597 
knew it was ethically questionable.  598 
 Another potential harm to patients never mentioned by either side is the fact that in a 599 
proportion results from any type of diagnostic study there will be an anomalous result, often a 600 
false-positive, that requires further investigation. This often causes anxiety and further cost 601 
for patients needing additional studies, as was noted in the debate around mammography for 602 
breast cancer screening.119  603 
Even under these dubious circumstances, inclusion in Medicare was a significant 604 
achievement for chiropractic. In 1972, few inroads had been made towards government 605 
reimbursement for chiropractic services anywhere in the world, nor were there chiropractors 606 
on staff in government hospitals. This event influenced contemporaneous registration and 607 
reimbursement inquiries on chiropractic in several countries, but at least one, New Zealand, 608 
stated that they “did not consider the formula applied in USA to be appropriate for their 609 
area.”120 The places where chiropractic has had the best success with integration into 610 
government provision of healthcare are Denmark, Switzerland, and Canada. In those 611 
countries, chiropractors in subsequent decades decided largely to abandon traditional 612 
paradigms. Consequently, they are reimbursed equivalently with other practitioners. In 613 
addition, those countries, and particularly Alberta in Canada, have the highest utilization rates 614 
for chiropractic, about twice that of other areas.121 The first government investigation of cost-615 
effectiveness for chiropractic was a study in Canada on low-back pain in 1993; it reported 616 
positive findings.122 However, evidence for improved patient outcomes from chiropractic 617 
treatment based on the radiographic demonstration of chiropractic subluxations or postural 618 
changes has never been documented in a peer-reviewed, indexed journal. 619 
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In 1979 the U.S. House of Representatives held hearings on overexposure to 620 
diagnostic x-rays. Herman Olsen, president of the ACA, authored a submission representing 621 
both his organization and the ICA, urging the elimination of the mandate for x-rays. The 622 
General Accounting Office, a non-partisan bureau of analysts for the U.S. government, also 623 
submitted the following statement regarding the chiropractic x-ray requirement: “Since the x-624 
ray serves no medical benefit… the patient is unnecessarily exposed to hazardous radiation 625 
solely to fulfil an administrative requirement. The cost of the x-ray can be an expensive 626 
burden to the Medicare beneficiary as well.”123 But, this attempt to change the legislation 627 
failed. The x-ray requirement was not removed from the Medicare regulations until 1 January 628 
2000, when components of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 were enacted.124 Chiropractors 629 
remained reimbursable only for manual manipulation to remove spinal “subluxations,” but 630 
the subluxations could be documented by means other than x-ray.125  631 
CONCLUSION 632 
This episode highlights an inherent conflict of interest in professional associations 633 
that represent registered healthcare practitioners. Although the associations are bound to 634 
protect and promote the interests of their members, not the public, the boards of professional 635 
associations are largely comprised of professionals who are ethically bound to protect the 636 
public.126 The events described herein demonstrate that the focus by both organized 637 
chiropractic and organized medicine was not solely on public interest but rather more heavily 638 
on the interests of their respective professions. It shows the distortion of perspective that may 639 
result during a “turf war”, in which two professions fight for, inter alia, public status and 640 
healthcare dollars, with inadequate consideration of the patients receiving their services. 641 
During this conflict, the stakes were high on both sides. Organized medicine framed 642 
its position as protectors of the public from the “rabid dogs” and “killers” that were 643 
chiropractors.127 Biggs portrayed this episode as a critical junction in the legitimization and 644 
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economic survival of chiropractic as a profession. Recognition under Medicare raised 645 
chiropractic’s status and failure to be included would have meant that the cohort of Medicare 646 
patients may have gone on to receive services from other practitioners, like 647 
physiotherapists.128 But it had negative effects for the profession, as well. It reinforced the 648 
traditional chiropractic belief system and it did not conform to radiation safety guidelines.129  649 
All the professional associations involved in this battle lost sight of the civic duty that 650 
comes with being a healthcare provider. The AMA decided to bet that the altering the 651 
Medicare legislation would make it useless to chiropractors, but they lost the wager because 652 
chiropractors found a way to work within the limits of the legislation. The AMA did not 653 
adequately consider the consequences in the event that they lost. 654 
Within chiropractic, the ICA had long promoted the use of x-rays for subluxation 655 
analysis, although there was, and still is, little evidence to support that belief. This meant that 656 
the scope of the legislation posed no ethical problem for them, but they were unhappy about 657 
the lack of reimbursement. Some chiropractors in the ACA, though, compromised their 658 
values on requiring clinical justification for the use of ionising radiation. The ACA advocated 659 
for a system that they did not really believe in so that they could gain the political “win” of 660 
becoming providers for Medicare patients.  661 
For its part, the state took the expedient course. Legislators responded to the weight of 662 
popularity of chiropractic, rather than clinical evidence for its effectiveness. They also 663 
responded to strong emotions attached to the patriotic argument of freedom of choice. At 664 
least one Senator has indicated that the change requiring radiography of all chiropractic 665 
Medicare patients inserted into the conference committee report was considered insignificant 666 
in the scheme of the overall bill.130 Few Senators or Representatives would have been willing 667 
to vote against Medicare expansion because of a change to one element in one part of the bill, 668 
a large and popular piece of legislation.  669 
 28 
Both medical and chiropractic professional associations put politics ahead of patients, 670 
and the state took a course of compromise, trying to please everyone and ending up pleasing 671 
no one. The damage from decades of x-rays being unjustifiably used on the Medicare 672 
population has not been quantified, but is certain to exist. It manifested in several ways: in 673 
potential damage to patients’ health, the financial cost of x-rays, and by causing stress as well 674 
as further diagnostic testing for patients with false-positive x-ray results. All parties, 675 
including most importantly patients, would have benefitted if those involved in the battle for 676 
chiropractic inclusion in Medicare had looked to evidence-based practice paradigms and 677 
patient-focused care as their main objectives. 678 
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